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KANT AS INTERNALIST: 
THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI PROPOSITION OF KANT'S ETHICAL THEORY 
NELSON T. POTTER 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
Kant claims that his categorical imperative is a synthetic, a priori 
proposition, but he does not make clear what makes this proposition 
synthetic or a priori. In this essay it is argued that in Kant's view the 
proposition is synthetic a priori because it states a quasi-psychological 
fact: that rational beings are capable of acting from purely moral mo-
tives. This means that Kant is an "internalist" in W.D. Falk's sense. 
t t t 
I 
Kant tells us that the categorical imperative is a synthe-
tic a priori proposition (1902-42, 4:420). We know from the 
Critique of Pure Reason that such propositions are likely to 
be very important but also very difficult to justify. And, 
indeed, we find that Kant believes the categorical imperative 
to state a very important proposition and to be very difficult 
to justify (1902-42, 4:420, 444-445). Further, he believes it 
important to justify this proposition, because if it cannot be 
justified, then morality may be merely a "phantom of the 
brain" (1902-42, 4:445). Although Kant covers much diffi-
cult and important ground in moral theory in the first two 
chapters of the Grundlegung, he leaves the task of justification 
of the categorical imperative to the notoriously difficult and 
obscure third and final chapter. 
In this paper I wish, first, to set forth briefly an inter-
pretation of what the synthetic a priori proposition is that 
Kant is seeking to justify. What this proposition is is not 
obvious; indeed, though little has been written on this subject 
in recent literature, there is potential for controversy and 
dispute. It seems important to understand just what this 
proposition is because without such knowledge we cannot 
understand Kant's attempted justification of the proposition. 
Second, I will discuss briefly some consequences of my 
interpretation, and in particular the idea that Kant is an 
"internalist" in Falk's (1947-8) and Frankena's (1958) sense 
of that term. 
Finally, in an appendix I will mention a textual problem 
faced by this and other interpretations of Kant on this point. 
II 
As is well known, Kant states a number of different 
formulations of the categorical imperative, which he claims 
are equivalent to what is commonly called the "first formula-
tion." He (1902-42, 4:413) says: 
There is therefore only a single categorical impera-
tive and it is this: "Act only on that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law. " 
The emphasized proposition might not seem a prormsmg 
candidate for a synthetic a priori proposition. For one thing, 
it is an imperative. Usually only sentences in the indicative 
are said to be either synthetic or analytic, but this is easily 
remedied, for Kant says that "imperatives are expressed by an 
ought." Thus we may rewrite the categorical imperative: 
(persons) ought to act only on maxims through 
which they can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law . 
And, to make the subject-predicate nature of the proposition 
more explicit, we might further rewrite it: 
(persons) are things that ought to act only on 
maxims, etc. 
We might further ask just what Kant intends the subject 
of the sentence to be, the subject which we have so far indi-
cated with an expression intended to be as neutral as possible-
"Persons." There are strong textual indications, both in the 
Grundlegung and elsewhere, that Kant intends the subject to 
be ''rational beings" or "a rational being" (1902-42, 4:42On, 
426427,435,438,440; 5 :46; 4:26-28). 
Furthermore, let us alter our predicate so that we may 
concentrate our discussion on the issues of present interest. 
In Chapter One of the Grundlegung, Kant analyzes the con-
cept of the good will, showing by conceptual analysis (ad-
mittedly controversial) that a good will acts only from the 
motive of duty and that the principle of actions from the 
motive of duty is the purely formal principle that is stated by 
the first formulation of the categorical imperative (1974). 
The point of this analysis, it seems to me, is to analyze the 
general concept of morality, or the idea of what it is to be in 
possession of a moral nature. I propose to substitute the pre-
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analytic concept of having a moral nature for the analyzed 
formulation of the categorical imperative, because the issues 
I wish to consider in this essay do not deal with whether the 
Kantian analysis of these concepts is correct or with, for 
example, relations between the different formulations of the 
categorical imperative, but rather with these pre-analytic 
concepts and the light that consideration of them may throw 
on the nature of "the categorical imperative." Thus, we 
have the following principle, stated in largely pre-analytic 
terms, a principle which is presupposed by the categorical 
imperative: 
A rational being is a being with a moral nature. 
This proposition, then, is synthetic a priori (190242, 4: 
26-28). 
But just what does it mean to be in possession of a moral 
nature? I would like to suggest three possible meanings: 
(1) To be subject to the moral law in the sense of 
being morally responsible for one's actions. 
(2) To be aware of moral principles, moral considera-
tions, on occasion to judge one's own and others' 
actions by moral principles, perhaps on occasion 
to feel guilt, indignation, and other moral feelings. 
(3) To be capable of acting from purely moral mo-
tives. 
Kant pretty clearly intended (1) as part of the mean-
ing of morality. Surely for Kant to be a moral being and not 
to be accountable for one's actions would be a contradiction. 
At times Kant seems even to use "accountable" and "moral" 
as synonyms (190242,4:26-28). 
It also seems that the kinds of things mentioned under 
(2) are, in Kant's view, associated with having a moral nature. 
Kant discusses moral emotions, in particular "respect," as an 
important ethical concept and an indispensible moral emotion 
(190242, 4 :400; 5 :7lff). The idea that we are conscious of a 
"moral law within" ourselves is a recurring idea in Kant's 
moral philosophy (190242, 5:29-30, 161); this consciousness 
serves a key role in the very justification of the categorical 
imperative in the second Critique (190242, 5:29-31). Fin-
ally, when we read Kant's lectures on education (they are 
primarily on moral education), we fmd that he believes that 
the moral law is within each of us; education consists only 
of leading it out and bringing it to full consciousness (1902-
42,9:437-500). 
But it might be asked: Are these characteristic moral 
phenomena analytically or synthetically associated with the 
concept of a moral being, or of morality as such? Perhaps, for 
example, respect, though in Kant's view clearly associated 
with morality for all human beings, is not, according to 
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him, part of the concept of morality, but rather simply an 
associated phenomenon. I think this objection is difficult to 
answer. Some of the things mentioned under (2) may well 
have been intended by Kant to be part of the concept of 
morality or of a moral being, but it would be, I believe, diffi-
cult to show. Thus, for the present we must leave the question 
of meaning (2) unresolved. 
Is (3) a part of the meaning of "moral being"? Before 
trying to answer this question, let us consider briefly what it 
means if the answer is "yes." One of the more interesting 
consequences is that Kant would be an internalist, in the 
meaning of that term used by W.D. Falk (1947-8) and William 
Frankena (1958). An ''internalist'' believes that a reference 
to the existence of motives in the agent must be made in the 
analysis of a moral judgment; the "externalist" denies this 
(1958:41). If (3) is true, i.e., if to be a moral being one must 
be capable of acting from purely moral motives, then, since 
moral judgments are true only of moral beings, one of the 
truth conditions for any moral judgment (and hence part of 
its meaning) will be the proposition that the agent is capable 
of acting from purely moral motives. (perhaps it is worth 
noting here that Kant believes that even the morally evil and 
depraved man will be moved to act out of moral motives in 
cases where such action will not conflict with his own selfish 
desires and interests; hence in Kant's view, moral motivation 
will not be a mere theoretical capability, but a dispositional 
motive in the sense of "an occurrent motive under certain 
conditions. ") 
Let us ask again, Is (3) also part of the meaning of 
"moral being"? I think the correct answer is "Yes." Through-
out the Grundlegung Kant is concerned with moral motiva-
tion when he is discussing the categorical imperative. For 
example, at the beginning of Chapter Two, when he is con-
sidering the question of whether morality may not be a 
"phantom of the human imagination" (190242, 4 :407), the 
question he considers is whether a morally motivated action 
has ever been performed (190242,4:407408). And Kant-
when he raises in Chapter Two the question of whether the 
categorical imperative is "possible"-seems to be asking, 
once again, a question about the possibility of moral motiva-
tion (190242, 4:417420). Again, his discussion of autonomy 
is largely in terms of motivation; heteronomy is said to be the 
will's being determined by something outside itself; whereas, 
autonomy is the will's self-determination (190242, 4:431-
433). Also, in the second Critique, the question is stated: Can 
pure reason be practical? And if pure reason can be practical, 
this means, Kant tells us, that " ... of itself and independently 
of everything empirical it [Le., pure reason] can determine 
the will" (190242, 5 :42). So, once again, the question con-
cerns "determination of the will" and, hence, motivation. 
If (3) is, indeed, correct, that is, if to be a moral being 
is to be capable of acting from purely moral motivation, and 
if Kant, in justifying the categorical imperative, is mainly 
trying to justify the proposition that all rational beings possess 
this capability (in virtue of their being moral beings), what 
follows? 
A. We might ask, why should Kant feel the necessity 
of some purely rational, non-sensuous motivation necessarily 
connected with morality? There are, no doubt, many reasons. 
One set of reasons surrounds his discussion of autonomy; 
any motivation other than such a purely rational, moral 
motivation would be heteronomous, would come from out-
side; hence, in following it, we would not so much be acting 
as be acted upon. But perhaps just as interesting is a related 
point: Heteronomous motives are only contingently related 
to morally required actions; perhaps we will have theheter-
onomous motivations necessary to do what is morally required 
of us (e.g., perhaps we were born and/or bred to be kindly 
persons)-but then again, perhaps not. There is no necessity 
that any heternonomous, sensuous motive will be adequate 
to move us to do what is morally required; and if these were 
the only motives available to us, there would be no certainty 
that, in a given instance, we could have done what was morally 
required of us. But a purely rational, moral motive, if it exists, 
is always and in every case capable of providing a motive 
adequate to bring about our doing an action that is otherwise 
in our power (e.g., not beyond our physical capability). Thus, 
the capability of acting from purely moral motives brings with 
it a guarantee of moral responsibility. 
B. This interpretation makes Kant an "internalist," 
as we have already remarked, but not one who will have to 
"trim obligation to the size of individual motives" (1958: 
80), since, in Kant's view, the capability for purely moral 
motivation will not limit our obligations but will, rather, 
serve to guarantee them. I· cannot adequately consider here 
whether the kind of motivation which Kant claims lies at the 
basis of morality really is a possible kind of motivation 
(1965:301-349). I am inclined to believe that such motives 
are possible and that this can be seen when we once under-
stand such motives: They cannot be interpreted metaphysi-
cally, as Kant did; I find it hard to take seriously Kant's meta-
physical story of noumenal causes of moral action. But 
perhaps a formula such as the following may be useful, as well 
as Kantian in spirit: One acts from morally good motives if 
he does what is right for the reasons that it is right. All that 
this formula for morally good motives requires is that the 
justifying reasons (those features of the situation in virtue of 
which an action is corr~ctly concluded to be right, wrong, etc.) 
be one and the same as motivating reasons. This may not be an 
impossible demand. 
APPENDIX 
There is a text in Kant which directly conflicts with the 
interpretation of the synthetic a priori proposition of Kant's 
ethical theory that I have just put forward, and which con-
flicts, I believe, with most other reasonable interpretations of 
Kant. I propose to mention and briefly discuss this text, with-
out being able to propose any very satisfactory way of inter-
preting it or dealing with the problems that it presents to 
the interpreter. 
A text is more significant for a given point of interpre-
tation, the more explicit it is on that point and the more 
prominently placed in the author's text the point is. I must 
say, however, that I believe that no text, no matter how 
explicit or prominently placed, can by itself overturn an inter-
pretation that is broadly based on a variety of other textual 
and argumentative sources; thus, I do not believe that this 
text confutes the interpretation of Kant that I have just pro-
posed. (It may be added that one reason I feel this way is that 
I do not see any plausible interpretation for this text; there 
seems to be no way to make very good sense of it.) 
The text occurs in the third paragraph of Chapter Three 
of the Grundlegung. Kant (190242,4:447) proposes to state 
explicitly what the synthetic, a priori proposition to be justi-
fied in this chapter is : 
Nevertheless the principle of morality is still a 
synthetic proposition, namely: "An absolutely 
good will is one whose maxim can always have 
as its content itself considered as a universal law" ; 
for we cannot discover this characteristic of its 
maxim by analyzing the concept of an absolutely 
good will. 
This passage certainly rates high in both explicitness and 
prominence. But it is hard to make sense of what Kant has 
here said. The proposition that he says is synthetic, a priori is, 
or seems to be, the same one that Kant's argument of Chapter 
One of the GrundZegung attempted to show to be an analytic 
proposition (1974). Thus, I cannot at all see why Kant says 
what he says in this passage; he seems to misspeak himself. 
And perhaps, fmally, that is the most reasonable interpreta-
tion of this passage, as a misspeaking, or as a slip of the pen. 
I wish I had a more satisfying proposal to make concerning 
the text. 
I.et me just note, in conclusion, that if instead of "good 
will" in the alleged synthetic a priori proposition, Kant had 
written ''rational will," this sentence and the discussion of it 
that follows would make much more sense. 
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